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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC.,
a Utah Corporation and
J. B. WALKER and GUDVOR W.
BRABY, dba WALKER SAND &
GRAVEL COMPANY,a
partnership,

Plafintiff- Respondent,

-vs.-

Case
No.10224

J. KENNETH THAYN dba
THAYN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
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Appeal From the Judgment of the Third District Court
For Salt Lake County, Utah
HoNORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, Judge

CLARENCE JACK FROST
716 Newhouse· Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for drJ.~h OF Ul A~~
H. ARNOLD RICH and
LEONARD W. ELTON
Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE SUPREME co~URT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC.,
a Utah Corporation and
J. B. WALKER and GUDVOR W.
BRABY, dba WALKER SAND &
GRAVEL COMP ANY,a
partnership,
Plalintiff- Respondent,

-vs.-

\
\

Case
No.10224

J. KENNETH THAYN dba
THAYN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
Defendant- Appellant.

BRIEF OF APP·ELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for an alleged breach of a leasehold
agreement and a counterclaim for a similar breach. The
Court over defendant's objection granted a hearing on
parts of plaintiffs' first Cause of Action under Chapter
33, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, relating to Decla.ra1
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tory Judgments. Defendants alleged that a Declaratory
Judgment was not appropriate.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Case was tried to the Court sitting without a
jury, the Court denying defendant's objections and granting judgment for plaintiffs that defendant's rights had
been terminated, cancelled and annulled to the leasehold
agreement (Tr. 43).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL,
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in his favor, or that failing a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties entered into a leasehold agreement dated
April 11, 1964, as represented by tvv-.o agreements attached to the Complaint (Tr. 9 through 12). One of the
instruments contained a prohibition against assignment
without lessor's written consent (Tr. 10). Pursuant to
this agreement defendant then entered into possession of
the premises described in the leasehold agreement and
oprated a hot asphalt plant until Novmber 12, 1963, when
with the plaintiff's verbal permission (L. 16-L. 30 P. 69,
L. 13-L. 30, P. 70) he entered into an agreement with
James C. Sumsion (Exhibit P. 1). Sumsion immediately
moved his equipment on premises and subsequently commenced operations without objection or incident from
2
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plaintiff until April 9, 1964, when defendant was served
with notice alleging termination and rescission of the
leasehold agreement (Tr. 13-17). James C. Sumsion remained on premises and is presently operating the
premises.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PARTS OF PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION WERE APPROPRIATE FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.
(a) On June 8, 1964, plaintiffs filed a Motion for immediate trial which was heard by Judge Alden Anderson on June 15, 1964 ( Tr. 32 and Tr. 36). Because the
argument appeared lengthy and because plaintiff did not
have witness in Court Judge Anderson assigned the matter to Judge Ellett for hearing and disposition (Tr. 36).
Without giving defendant's counsel any notice and
without a hearing plaintiff arranged with Judge Hansen
to hear the cause of action without having its motion for
immediate trial heard and without having plaintiffs' objections timely filed (Tr. 37 and Tr. 40-41). At the
actual trial defendant advised the Court that plaintiffs'
motion for an immediate trial and the objections thereto
had not been heard. The Court then proceeded to try
the case and indicated that it would take under advisement defendant's objections (L. 4-L. 18-P. 61). However,
the motion and objections were were never heard and the
Court in its order (Tr. 43) cursorily stated that the de-

3
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fenda.nt's objection should be denied. This action was
patently arbitrary and denied defendant its right to be
heard.
(h) There was no necessity that parts of the First
Cause of Action be heard in advance of the entire case.
Mr. Sumsion, who was operating under the lease of
the defendant Thayn, was a progressive contractor who
was able and did use as much material as did the defendant when he was working alone. (L. 22, Tr. 70, to L. 2
Tr. 71). The plaintiff had a working agreement with
Sumsion (L. 21-L. 25, Tr. 84) which is still currently in
effect which negates the allegation in plaintiffs' affidavit
that he will be irreparably damaged and that he would be
deprived of sales opportunities ( Tr. 25 and 26).
(c) By hearing only part of the First Cause of Action, the Court prevented the defendant from presenting
the plaintiff's breach of the lease and did not terminate
the uncertainty or controversy.
Section 78-33-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states:
''The Court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.''
In the Utah case Gray v. Defa, 103 Ut. 339, the Court
in commenting on the above statute observed:
''Borchard in his work on Declaratory Judgments,
says that the rule announced by this section

4
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merely embodies the established Anglo-American
practice in all urisdictions and indicates both the
practical and remedial scope and limitations of
the relief, yet the discretion granted, however,
wide and unlimited in appearance is a udicial discretion hardened by experience into rule, and its
exercise is subject to appellate review. He concludes that when the declaratory judgment will
not serve a useful p·urpose in clarifying and settling the legal issues, or will not terminate and
afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and
controversy giving rise to the proceeding the
Court should decline to render the same.''
Granting for the sake of argument that the allegations of plaintiff have some substance, if the Court refuses to hear the defendant's allegations of breach and
damages (Tr. 21-24) it cannot as a matter of law conclude that the controversy is terminated. By granting
plaintiff udgment there has been little if any of the controversy terminated as it has not touched the main purpose of the contract.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS' ACTION TERMINATED, CANCELLED AND ANNULLED THE RIGHTS OF
DEFENDANT TO LEASEHOLD AGREEMENT.
The Court in rendering its finding was rather vague
in that it did not specify whether all of the activity of
defendant was objectionable or whether it was just one
area (Tr. 43). However, plaintiffs' counsel did limit the
5
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plaintiff in his presentation to three items of alleged
breach:
''The pertinent parts of the leasehold agreement
are that it carries the definite statement in Paragraph 8 of non-assignability without a. written
consent. It also contains certain payments which
should he made by the Lessor and is an agreement
to designate the occupied area and fence it. Now
simply it is upon those items of breach upon which
we will predicate the problem and which would be
the subect of the declaratory udgment.'' (L. 24
Tr. 61 to L. 2 Tr. 62)
First of all, in considering these items of breach, it
should be noted that plaintiff's only witness was the defendant even though the plaintiff, J. B. Walker was in
the courtroom. The defendant's testimony was never
contradicted and therefore the, plaintiff by failing to take
the stand and testify contrary to the defendant, admits
and affirms the latter's testimony.
In regard to paragraph 8 of non-assignability of the
original lease ( Tr. 10) it is obvious that this restriction
was waived by the plaintiff. Defendant testified, while
sitting in the presence of the plaintiff who did not in any
way deny or object, that defendant discussed the idea of
Sumsion operating the plant with plaintiff and that the
plaintiff assented thereto. (L. 16, Tr. 69, to L. 14, Tr. 71)
(L. 29, Tr. 78, to L. e, Tr. 79)
In addition the defendant Thayn, Richard Sumsion
and an employee of Sumsion all testified that Sumsion
went immediately into possession of the leased property
after the agreement "\vas signed November 12, 1963, and
6
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that plaintiff made no objection until April 10, 1964 (L.
7, Tr. 73, to L. 20 Tr. 73), (L. 29, Tr. 73, to L. 26, Tr. 74),
(L. 1, Tr. 83, to L. 1, Tr. 84) (L. 1, Tr. 87, to L. 19, Tr.
87). The plaintiff not only did not object to Sumsion
being on the property and operating under the lease he
received money from Sumsion prior to his serving notice on the defendant (L. 19-L. 30, Tr. 83).
The general law relating to waiver of covenants
restricting assignment is found in American J urisprudence as follows :
''Covenants restricting the assignment of leases
usually by their terms require the consent of the
lessor to an assignment, but regardless of the
wording of the covenena.nt, a breach will not result from an assignment made with the consent
of the lessor. Covenants restricting assignments
are for the benefit of the lessor and may be .waived
by him, and since he may waive the restriction
entirely, he may waive compliance with particular terms and conditions of the restriction. Even
though the covenant requires the written consent
of the lessor to an assignment, his oral consent
may nevertheless be deemed sufficient on the
ground either of waiver or of estoppel. Parol
testimony as to the assignor's representations
that such consent has been obtained is not inadmissible as varying or contradicting a written
instrument. So, if, with knowledge of the assignment, the lessor accepts from the assignee
payment of the accruing rents, this is ordinarily,
if unexplained, deemed conclusive evidence of a
consent to the assignment, or waiver of the necessity for a prior consent, since it is a recognition
of the assignee as a tenant.'' 32 Am. ~J ur. Sec. 341,
Page 303.

7
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With reference to the provision for payments to be
made, plaintiffs' counsel indicates in the transcript that
lessor should make certain payment (L. 29, Tr. 61). This
is apparently a mistake and probably should be interpreted to mean lessee should make payments. The only
payments mentioned by plaintiff during the proceeding
was an item for taxes in the amount of $1,054.00 (L. 9,
Tr. 64, to L. 29, Tr. 64), (Exhibit P. 2).
From the face of the exhibit it is apparent that the
plaintiff had not required payment of taxes as they accrued as his first and only statement dated January 1,
1964, covered a period of time of over three years. This
is and of itself indicates that he was waiting for some
event prior to submitting a bill. The defendant's unquestioned and unrebutted testimony gives the answer. Simply, that the parties had never agreed upon what part of
the plaintiffs' property was necessary for the operation
covered by the lease and that defendant had not been
in possession of the lease for the period of time covered
by the statement o ftaxes (L. 22, Tr. 76, to L. 25, Tr. 77).
How could taxes be apportioned if the parties had not
reached an agreement as to the amount of property to
be used~ The pertinent provision of the lease providing
for payment of taxes specifically provides that lessee
should only pay "the pro-rata property tax" (Paragraph 3, Tr. 9).
The third and concluding item of plaintiffs' allegation of breach centers around the failure to designate,
survey, and fence area needed for the operation covered
by the lease. Paragraph 1, Tr. 9, contains the pertinent

8
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language covering this problem. '' L.essor here by leases
-sufficient property located on the east side of W a.satch
Boulevard - for the purpose set forth hereinabove with
the further provision that the lessee taking into consideration the requirements necessary, will designate the
area needed which area will then be surveyed and the
description of said property will be attached hereto and
made a part hereof as a supplemental agreement.''
While it appears that the Lease requires the lessee to
designate the area necessary it must be construed to be a
mutual designation of property. However, this language
is vague and uncertain as to who has the responsibility of
surveying and fencing the property even though defendant has indicated he was willing to survey it. The only
testimony offered regarding the drafting of the original
leases indicates that plaintiff drafted the documents.
(L. 1 to L. 10, Tr. 69)
It is usually the practice of the law to construe any
ambiguity or uncertainty most strictly against that party
who drew the agreement. However, wherever the responsibility lies, common sense and practice indicates
that in order to use another person's property and fence
it, there must be an assent and a designation by the owner
to the property. I~ is uncontested that these paries operated for approximately three years without the questio11
of taxes, fences and surveys being raised which certainly
raises an inference that both parties assented to the situation until they could mutually designate the area; that
is until plaintiff ascertained he could sell the lease (L.
24, Tr. 74).
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

If defendant had the sole responsibility for the performance of the items mentioned above, and the defendant denies that he does, still the plaintiff after three years
of operation without obection is now estopped from precipitously terminating the lease. In any event this type
of alleged breach is not of the nature to warrant or justify rescission as is set out in American J ;1risprudence
2nd:
''On the other hand, it is not every breach of a
contract or failure exactly to perform-certainly
not every partial failure to perform - that entitles the other party to rescind. Recission is not
permitted for a slight, casual, trivial, or tec.hnical
breach.
''A breach, to warrant rescission, must be material; a failure to perform, to warrant rescission,
must be substantial. In the absence of any specific provision in the contract to the contrary, a
beach which goes to only a part of the consideration, which is incidental and subordinate to the
main purpose of the contract, and which may he
compensated in damages, does not warrant a recision of the contract; the injured party is still
bound to perform his part of the agreement, and
his only remedy for the breach consists of the
damages he has suffered therefrom. A rescission
is not warranted by a mere breach of contract not
so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the
object of the parties in making the agreement.
Before partial failure of performance of one party
"rill give the owner the right of rescission, the act
failed to be performed must go to the root of the
contract, or defeat the objects of the contract, or
the failure to perform a part of the contract must
be in regard to matters ,,. .hich "\vould render the
performance of the remainder a thing different in

10
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suhstantance from that which was contracted for,
or it must concern a matter of such importance
that the contract would not have been made if the
default in that particular had been contemplated
or expected. Generally, where a contract is severable or divmisible and the consideration is justly
apportioned to a part of the contract, a breach of
that part does not destroy the contract in toto, but
the other party is nelegated to damages. 17 Am.
Jur. 2d Par. 504, Page 982-984."
The defendant has indicated a willingness to pay the
taxes, survey the property and even fence the property if
the plaintiff will sit down and discuss the area to he
used, and apportion the taxes on a fair and equitable
basis (L. 22, Tr. 75 to L. 25, Tr. 77).
This area certainly is not the main object of the
agreement and even if the alleged breaches were unexplained still they would not defeat the main purpose of
the agreement and would not justify rescission or termination of the contract. The object of the agreement
between Thayn and plaintiff \Vas the purchase and sale
of aggregate for roadbase which is not even mentioned
in the plaintiffs' grounds for Declaratory Judgment.
POINT III.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TI-IE
DEFENDANT AND SUMSION WAS A SUB
LEASE AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE.
Volume 32, Am. Jur., Section 330, states the applicable law as to the distinction between a sub lease and an
assignment in reference to a covenant not to assign.

11
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''To establish a breach of a covenant in a lease
not to assign the lessor must show that the transaction relied upon constitutes an assignment in
law as defined above, ... he must show that the
lessee transferred his entire interest in the demised premises, or a part thereof, for the unexpired term of the original lease, parting with all
reversionary interest in respect of the premises
affected. An assignment of a lease is distinct
from a subletting, and it is well settled that a covenant not to assign is not broken by a mere subletting of the premises. Covenants restricting
the right of the lessee to assign his term are strictly construed, and in order to bring the transaction within the operation of such covenant, it
must be shown that the thing done falls within its
letter, as well as within its spirit and purpose.''
Section 314 of 32 Am. J ur. Page 290, states the distinction between subleases and assignments :
''The distinction between an assignment of a lease
and the subletting of the premises lies in the quantity of interest that passes by the transfer and
not upon the extent of the premises involved. Primarily the test is vYhether by the transaction the
lessee conveys his entire term or retains a reversionary interest however small. If there remains
a reversionary interest in the estate conveyed it is
a. sublease.''
The fact that the word
agreement between defendant
no more determinative of the
that the word ''lea.se'' is used

"assign" is used in the
Tha-,Yn (Exhibit P 1), is
legal effect than the fact
therein.

Bedgisoff v. Morga.n, 23 Wash. 2d 737, 162 P. 2d
238, holds that whether a 'vritten instrument is an as-:-

12
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signment or a lease· must be determined by its legal effect
not its form.
In examining paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Exhibit
P. 1, it is obvious that there is a reversionary interest in
the defendant Thayne and that the agreement thus meets
the qualification of the legal status of a lease even though
the language states that Thayn assigns to Sumsion.
The whole tenor of the agreement is that Exhibit P. 1
is subject to the leasehold agreement which was made
part of (Par. 1, Exhibit P. 1) the instrument. That upon
failure to make payment, the necessity of ceasing operation by Court order in two years, or the termination of
the agreement for any cause the lease would revert to
the defendant Thayn.

CONCLUSION
Defendant submits to the Court that the three allegations of breach by the plaintiff have been countered and
explained by the argument above. That provision 8 of
the lease regarding assignment without written consent
was waived. Waived expressly by the plaintiff by orally
agreeing to the operation by Sumsion. Waived by passage of time with knowledge of Sumsion's presence and
operation on plaintiffs' property and finally by the acceptance of money from Sumsion for the use and delivery
of gravel.
In addition the legal form of the agreement is a sublease and not prohibited by the restriction against
assignment.

13
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The allegation of failure to pay taxes loses its effectiveness when it is found that there has been no designation of what ground is being covered nor pro-rating
of taxes as required by the lease and especially when the
first request for payment is made nearly three years
after the agreement was commeneed. This deficiency, together with the surveying and fencing problems, are joint
failures or acquiescence by both parties. This action
would certainly estop plaintiff from immediately demanding p-erformanee without giving notice and without complying himself.
Defendant further contends that it has been deprived
of due process of la"\v in that he not been allowed his day
in Court on his objections to an immediate trial. That
because of this omission the Court deprived itself of information which would have indicated that a declaratory
judgment was not proper under the circumstances. That
defendant has been prejudiced in a substantial manner.
The defendant therefore respectfully requests that
the decision of the lower court be reversed or that the
matter be returned to the lower court for a hearing on the
necessity of a. declaratory judgment and a trial of the
entire matter at one hearing if necessary.
Respectfully submitted,

CLARENCE JACK FROST
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

